University of New Mexico

UNM Digital Repository
NotiCen

Latin America Digital Beat (LADB)

6-9-1989

Salvadoran Rebel Leader Ferman Cienfuegos On
Arena Government's Plans, Guerrilla Response
Deborah Tyroler

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/noticen
Recommended Citation
Tyroler, Deborah. "Salvadoran Rebel Leader Ferman Cienfuegos On Arena Government's Plans, Guerrilla Response." (1989).
https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/noticen/3110

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Latin America Digital Beat (LADB) at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NotiCen by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu.

LADB Article Id: 072665
ISSN: 1089-1560

Salvadoran Rebel Leader Ferman Cienfuegos On Arena
Government's Plans, Guerrilla Response
by Deborah Tyroler
Category/Department: General
Published: Friday, June 9, 1989
[Eduardo Sancho, alias Comandante Ferman Cienfuegos, is one of five members of the Farabundo
Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) General Command. Cienfuegos has been a guerrilla for
nearly 20 of his 41 years. The rebel commander was interviewed in May in Cabanas department
during a rebel offensive. The interview below appeared in an 05/28/89 report by the Regional
Coordination for Economic and Social Research of Central America and the Caribbean (CRIES,
Managua).] CRIES: How do you interpret the results of the [March 19 presidential] elections?
Cienfuegos: US plans included the possibility of ARENA [Nationalist Republican Alliance] coming
to power. ARENA understood this and prepared itself to take office, making its leadership and
what it said more suitable. That's why [ARENA founder and former major Roberto] D'Aubuisson
was replaced by someone more "moderate" like Alfredo Cristiani. This does not mean there are
two competing tendencies inside ARENA. Instead, there is a division of labor wherein some put
forward a moderate image and others do the dirty work. The election results are the product of a
strategy to take power that ARENA outlined after signing a pact with the Christian Democrat Party
(PDC) at Apeneca in 1983. The pact was the beginning of the Reagan administration's attempts to
create a political cover or facade for its low intensity warfare strategy. The pact was a "bipartisan"
arrangement allowing one or the other party to win the elections. It's a system of restricted pseudodemocracy, in which only the two parties signing the pact have access to freedom of action,
organization, and propaganda. In the elections, everything was stacked in favor of the bipartisan
system that the US wants to impose on El Salvador in imitation of its own system of alternating
parties. ARENA became stronger by taking up the call for change. The PDC lost control of the
Legislative Assembly and then split apart. The PDC also lost control of the judiciary. The executive
was then blocked, incapable of executing anything. Apparently, the Armed Forces stood aside from
the bipartisan struggle, acting as an...institution that would guarantee the pact imposed by the US.
However, there is a separate pact between the Armed Forces and the US on which economic and
military aid depends. Recently, ARENA initiated efforts to exercise direct control over the Armed
Forces. The US, with the aim of adapting the Apeneca pact to the current situation, acted to become
a partner of sorts with ARENA in such efforts. But, the Armed Forces are not really controlled by
ARENA, since they are dependent on the US. CRIES: What are the major aims underlying the
FMLN's latest proposal for negotiations? Cienfuegos: We proposed that a real democratic process
be opened up. Our proposal implies that the electoral route can be a political way out of the crisis
via identifying another government. The FMLN does not propose to disarm or surrender, nor do
we propose to commit political suicide. After negotiations a cessation of hostilities would begin
toward creating a situation in which the causes of the war could disappear. The FMLN is looking for
an end to the shooting and the start of a process to end the armed struggle. Before a cease-fire or
verification as put forward in the Esquipulas agreements take place, negotiations that would focus
on addressing the causes of the war would first have to occur. If not, the war will be be reactivated.
The crisis of legitimate power and the current situation of struggles to seize power continue because
the causes of the war and the structural crisis have not been resolved. Cristiani is buying time until
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October, the date for the approval of new US aid which is the first thing that he has to guarantee.
Until then, he will put on a moderate face. CRIES: With ARENA coming to power, will there be
a reshuffling of the alliances of Salvadoran political forces? Cienfuegos: The political maturity
exists for there to be a unification of all the organizations opposed to the military dictatorship of
the oligarchy. Today, more than ever, it's easy to understand that the dictatorship exists. With
[outgoing Christian Democrat President Jose Napoleon] Duarte, it was more difficult to clearly
see the continued existence of a counterinsurgency dictatorship since he carried out a program of
reforms. The dictatorship today has nothing to offer the people and it cannot claim that it supports
national unity. The oligarchy does not have the historical or practical capacity to be able to combine
forces and interests with the popular sectors. There is concern among membes of the popular
movement over ARENA's rise to power. They will have to find ways to defend themselves from
the attacks by the state, and to form a very large popular opposition. CRIES: What will ARENA do
about the mass organizations? Cienfuegos: The oligarchy, in order to secure its victory, has budgeted
for a quota of death. Our intelligence sources have told us of a three-phase plan. The first is to get
rid of the leadership of the popular movements. They have a list of some 2,000 leaders including
those of the UNTS [National Union of Salvadoran Workers], the UNOC [National Union of Workers
and Campesinos], the CTS [Salvadoran Workers' Central], and some Christian Democrats. During
this phase, the Armed Forces, in the capacity of soldiers and government security agents, will not
have to come into play, since they figure that heavily armed civilian groups can kill these 2,000
leaders. The second part of the plan consists of another round of massacres in the countryside such
as those which occurred in 1975 and 1982. They will go into the villages and exterminate families
that are part of the FMLN's network of collaborators. This means killing groups of 40 or 50 in each
village in order to instill terror. This phase of massive extermination would have the cutting edge of
psychological warfare as well. The third phase of the plan is to wipe out a large number of people
who support the FMLN. One sector of the army disagrees with this plan, which is being promoted
by ARENA's military committee inside the Armed Forces. Coercion and selective repression of the
media, and the recent killings of journalists are elements of the plan. One of the objectives is to
make foreign journalists shy away because of fear so that international repercussions are reduced.
They will try to provide a legal cover to all these activities. The Legislative Assembly will pass laws
to provide cover for the arrests or disappearances of people, or to justify actions by the Armed
Forces in this new phase of the war. This plan actually originated during a 1975 meeting between
members of the oligarchy and some military officers. At that time, then-major Roberto D'Aubuisson,
and Colonel Romero, who later became president, put forward the idea that it was no problem to
do away with some 100,000 people. The discussion at that meeting has been revived by a group
controlled by Sigfredo Ochoa [vice president of the Legislative Assembly] and D'Aubuisson, and by
a group within the oligarchy led by Orlando de Sola. CRIES: Can the popular organizations defend
themselves, or will ARENA be able to implement this plan? Cienfuegos: The FMLN won't stand by
with its arms folded. There are also various factors on the international level that would block such
massive repression. In the US itself, it is clear that any authorization of large-scale massacres will
carry a very high political cost. The United States Congress cannot long support a policy with such
a high degree of disrespect for human rights. CRIES: Will the FMLN change its military strategy
now that ARENA is in power? Cienfuegos: ARENA will develop its strategy of total war. Cristiani
has already said you can't wage war halfway. Sigfredo Ochoa says there can't be a war in which the
hands of the Armed Forces are tied. I am not going to outline our strategy and military tactics here,
but I have already said that faced with repression of this degree, the FMLN will not simply stand
aside. We're already showing that the economic war can be intensified. When Duarte was president,
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we did not do this; we hit the war economy related to electricity, transport, and communications. It
was a war of sabotage directed at the economic power of the state. But with a state of the oligarchy,
the war against the economy of the oligarchy will be intensified, hitting its property and its means
of production. The actions which we have already carried out are an indication of what is to come:
destruction that would leave the oligarchy without means of production. They would be left with
just the army, the government, and US aid. And there's already nothing in which to invest this
aid. There cannot be a Taiwanese process here; this isn't Hong Kong. The little dragons cannot
grow here. So the FMLN's message is clear: Let's negotiate, now! First we negotiate, because we're
not going to stop the war until there are real negotiations. Without real negotiations, the war
will intensify to the point where the country will be left in ruins. We have offered an opportunity
to the private sector and we believe that there are important businesspersons who want to see
negotiations. But the problem is with those inside ARENA like D'Aubuisson, Valdes, and Cristiani,
who are behind the death squads and who really do not represent the interests of all economic
groups. Within the Armed Forces, there are officers who want negotiations and peace, but there's
been no way to hold talks with them. The US has done everything to block anything like that. We
have sent a very serious letter to those officers, putting forward the need for dialogue. CRIES: Given
the current situation, is the FMLN going to prioritize the political struggle? Cienfuegos: Our April
6 proposal aims at making it clear that there is a chance to save the country from having to live
through more military conflict. The US is once again lining itself up with a minority and, in practice,
what they are doing is obstructing the negotiations process, even though they have not dismissed
it. Our proposal shows there are opportunities to resolve the problem using political means. The
FMLN militarily has defeated numerous kinds of war strategies and will continue to defeat all the
new ones. Right now, the FMLN is on the offensive. In other words, the only way to resolve the
conflict is to have the FMLN participate in a national search for a political solution. We are saying to
the US that war is costly. Peace is cheaper.

-- End --
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